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them. It is nearly impossible to determine how much, if anything, has
been done in this field and to measure its effectiveness. They also have
the more drastic remedy of local option.
In the final analysis, the chief hope of the cities may rest upon a
change in philosophy by the Ohio Supreme Court. That such a change
is taking place is dear from the Phillips case."8 How far it will go is
in the realm of supposition. If the decision in the Compola case69 that
the state has preempted the field is approved by the court, such a change
in philosophy will be effectively repudiated in one area. The outlook
for the cities would then be dark indeed."0
In answer then to the question raised at the outset of this article, i.e.,
do Ohio municipalities have the power to control the traffic in and the
consumption of intoxicating liquor within their limits; one can safely
say, theoretically yes. However, this power has been so limited that the
practical answer must be no.
REESE TAYLOR
Strict Liability for the Manufacturer of General
Products -Recent Developments
In the Wall Street Journal of August 31, 1960,1 there appeared a
front-page article announcing the new reaches of products-liability law.
The developments chronicled in that article are not of an ordinary na-
ture; they suggest a broad and elemental shifting in the legal relationship
between the manufacturer and the consumer. By convention, the legal
responsibility of the manufacturer to the consumer has rested in negli-
gence;2 there are now significant indications that that responsibility is to
be supplanted by one founded upon a doctrine of strict liability.
68. 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958).
69. 169 N.E.2d 558 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
70. The 1960 United States Census has added yet another facet to the problem facing mu-
nicipalities. The Department of Liquor Control has reported that under the population quota
system, an additional 604 liquor licenses will become available in Ohio during 1961. Under
the quota system, more liquor licenses are made available when population increases but they
are not taken away, if previously issued, when population decreases.
The most unfortunate feature of this development is that the majority of openings are in
the fast-growing and predominantly residential suburbs rather than in the more commercial
central cities. In Cuyahoga County, for example, there are 64 new license openings and none
of them are in Cleveland. This situation has led State Liquor Director Richard C. Crouch to
recommend that the cities be given more control over liquor quotas. (Past attempts by cities
to do this have failed. State ex rel. Cozart v. Carran, 133 Ohio St. 50, 11 NE.2d 245 (1937)).
Mr. Crouch will ask the legislature to allow cities to set their own limits on licenses as long
as the total is less than that set by the state. He will also ask the legislature to give the mu-
nicipalities specific power to pass liquor zoning laws. Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 8, 1960,
p. 1, col. 4.
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The doctrine of strict liability for the manufacturer has been the sub-
ject of exhaustive discussion and analysis. It is not necessary to restate
here the many arguments which have been advanced in support of the
doctrine.3 The social and economic philosophy which underlies those
arguments is well presented in the following lines:
... public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will
most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in de-
fective products that reach the market. It is evident that the manu-
facturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence
of others, as the public cannot. Those who suffer injury from defective
products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an in-jury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune
to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be
insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost
of doing business. It is to the public interest to discourage the mar-
keting of products having defects that are a menace to the public. If
such products nevertheless find their way into the market it is to the
public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may
cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the
manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the market 4
This philosophy has been upheld as humanitarian by many writers
and denounced as authoritarian by others. Whatever may be its merits,
it is a philosophy which has found vigorous new expression in the law.
The movement towards strict liability of the manufacturer has not
been an even and sweeping one. It has progressed irregularly along two
distinct legal courses. One of these has been express warranty, the other
implied warranty.'
EXPRESS WARRANTY
Since the Nineteen-Thirties a growing number of courts have taken
notice of the fact that the world of merchandising is a world of adver-
tising. They have observed that manufacturers discharge a steady and
inescapable stream of words which direct the consuming public to buy
their products. Claims of every description are made for these products,
1. Keatley, Products on Trial, The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 31, 1960, p.1, col.1.
2. The history of the negligence-based action against the manufacturer is treated briefly in
PROSSER, TORTS 497-500 (2d ed. 1955). For greater detail, see Feezer, Tort Liability of
Manufacturers, 19 MINN. L. REV. 752 (1935); Jeanblanc, Afanufacturers' Liability to Persons
Other Than Their Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L. REV. 134 (1937); Russell, Manufacturers'
Liability to the Ultimate Consumer, 21 KY. LJ. 388 (1933).
3. For a summary of the arguments for and against strict liability of the manufacturer, see
DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 134-42 (1951); see also 2
HARPER & JAMES, TORTS ch. 28 (1956); Strict Liability of Manufacturers: A Symposium, 24
TENN. L. RaV. 787 (1955). For a comprehensive bibliography of products-liability literature,
see GILLMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 30-32 (1960).
4. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (con-
curring opinion).
5. See generally 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY ch. 3 (1960).
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all touched with a seeming glow of verity, and all intended for the ulti-
mate consumer. Why, when these claims prove false and the consumer
is injured, should the manufacturer be permitted to deny direct liability
on the ground that no contractual ties exist between him and the con-
sumer? The courts have reasoned that he should not be so permitted,
and, accordingly, they have held that positive statements made in adver-
tisements, labels and sales brochures must be regarded as express warran-
ties to the ultimate consumer.' If the consumer can show that he has
relied to his injury on such a positive statement, he may recover in ex-
press warranty, even though the misrepresentation was innocently made
and the product's defect not attributable to negligence in its manufac-
ture.7 Liability for the misrepresentation is absolute.
This doctrine of express warranty-through-advertising is now firmly
established in the law. Since the leading case of Baxter v. Ford Motor
Company was decided in 1932, few courts have refused to adopt it.'
Inasmuch as the gravamen of the express warranty action is the mis-
representation, judicial acceptance of the express warranty-through-ad-
vertising theory cannot be regarded as tantamount to judicial acceptance
of an all-encompassing policy of liability without fault for the manu-
facturer. But this in no way alters the effect of the express warranty ac-
tion. Since the liability for the manufacturer's representation is "strict"
(in the sense that no negligence or scienter need be proved), the courts'
unexpressed convictions toward the risk-spreading philosophy of such
liability are not directly material.
IMPLIED WARRANTY
Simply stated, an implied warranty provides that the particular goods
are reasonably suited to the general purposes for which they were manu-
6. Id. at § 16.04 (4) (a). The following passage from the opinion in Rogers v. Toni Home
Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 248-49, 147 NXE.2d 612, 615 (1958), is illuminating:
Today, many manufacturers of merchandise... make extensive use of news-
papers, periodicals, signboards, radio and television to advertise their products. The
worth, quality and benefits of these products are described in glowing terms and in
considerable detail, and the appeal is almost universally directed to the ultimate con-
sumer.... The consuming public ordinarily relies exclusively on the representations
of the manufacturer in his advertisement. What sensible reason then exists as to
why, when the goods purchased by the ultimate consumer on the strength of the ad-
vertisements aimed squarely at him do not possess their described qualities and
goodness and cause him harm, he should not be permitted to move against the manu-
facturer to recoup his loss.
See Advertised-Product Liability: A Symposiua, 8 C.v.-MA. L. REv. 1 (1959).
7. See PROSSER, TORTS § 88, at 546-49, § 89 (2d ed. 1955); James, Produacts Liability, 34
TE As L REv. 192 (1955).
8. 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932). For a discussion of this case and others of more
recent vintage see 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABITry § 16.04(4) (a) (1960).
9. See I FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABIITY § 16.04(4) (a) (1960).
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factured and sold." Although an implied warranty arises when a con-
tract of sale is formed, it is independent of the contract terms. It is a
warranty imposed by law." It may be nullified only by the mutual con-
sent of the parties to the sale.'" Although its genesis was in tort, im-
plied warranty has come to be governed, under most circumstances, by
the law of contracts.' This hybrid nature of the warranty action has
been both beneficial and detrimental in the defective products cases.
Because it is a creature of the law and of public policy, implied warranty
has immediate allure for those liberal courts which endorse and seek to
implement the philosophy of strict liability for the manufacturer. On
the other hand, the contractual elements of warranty give conservative
courts a convenient means of avoiding difficult policy decisions by barring
consumer actions for technical reasons.
The Privity Requirement
The technicality which dominates the implied warranty action is
privity of contract. Most courts, loath to inflict the broad liability which
implied warranty may bring, have purposely ignored the tort antecedents
of warranty and have continued to call for a showing of privity. 4 This
obdurate stand in the implied warranty actions has come in the face of
privity's virtual extinction in the negligence and express warranty ac-
tions. 5  The reasons for this inconstancy are not altogether dear. Per-
haps there has been a realization that express warranty-through-advertis-
ing, based as it is on an express misrepresentation, is an essentially lim-
ited means of imposing strict liability upon the manufacturer. Perhaps
there has been an a priori feeling that the express misrepresentation im-
ports a greater "moral" culpability. But, whatever judicial thought has
been, there is no question that it has been directed by considerations of
policy rather than by the technicalities of the law, for it is clear that the
"technical" force of privity must be the same in both express and implied
warranty actions.
The first use of implied warranty in actions by the consumer against
the remote manufacturer came in cases involving adulterated foods and
10. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 370, 161 A.2d 69, 76
(1960). See generally, Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN.
L REv. 117 (1943).
11. See, e.g., Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 89, 216 N.W. 790, 791 (1927).
12. 1A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. S 71. See also James, Products Liability, 34 TaxAs L. Ray.
192, 210-12 (1955).
13. See generally, Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L.
REV. 117 (1943).
14. See authorities cited in notes 2 and 3 supra.
15. The history of the privity requirement is given in the authorities cited in note 3, supra.
See also Spruill, Privity of Contract as a Requisite for Recovery on Warranty, 19 N.C.L. REy.
551 (1941).
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beverages."8 Despite the peregrinations of the early decisions, a majority
of those states having any definite law on the subject now permit the
consumer who has been injured by adulterated foods or beverages to re-
cover directly against the manufacturer in an implied warranty action.'
Privity of contract in these cases has been defeated (and strict liability
supported) by the strong emotional reaction to noxious foods. This
language of a Texas court is typical:
It seems to be the rule that where food products sold for human con-
sumption are unfit for that purpose, there is such an utter failure of the
purpose for which the food is sold, and the consequences of eating un-
sound food are so disastrous to human health or life, that the law im-
poses a warranty of purity in favor of the ultimate consumer as a mat-
ter of public policy.'8
In the express warranty actions the policy preoccupations have been
with the character of the misrepresentation rather than with the product;
in the implied warranty actions the policy considerations (and thus the
decisions) have been directly related to the defective product involved.
For many years the strict liability of the manufacturer to the remote con-
sumer of unwholesome foods was regarded as an exception to the general
rule that no liability existed in implied warranty where privity of contract
was absent. Then, in the Nineteen-Fifties, came several decisions which
lifted the privity bar in implied warranty actions involving products in-
tended for intimate bodily use. 9 These decisions were dearly taken by
analogy to the food and beverage cases. With respect to other products
of a general nature, the reluctance to impose strict liability through im-
plied warranty persisted.
This brief survey has led to the recent developments of which the
Wall Street Journal has spoken.
The Recent Cases
Claus Henningsen purchased for his wife a new Plymouth. Ten days
after it was delivered by Bloomfield Motors, Inc., Chrysler Corporation's
authorized dealer, Mrs. Henningsen set out on a short driving trip. The
car performed in a normal fashion until, on her return home, it suddenly
veered off the road, crashing into a brick wall. Mrs. Henningsen was
seriously injured.
16. The so-called "food cases" are discussed in detail in DIcKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY
AND THE FOOD CONSUMR 134-42 (1951).
17. Prosser, The Arsault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.
1099, 1103-10 (1960).
18. Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 612, 164 S.W.2d 828, 829 (1942).
19. Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954) (hair dye); Markovich
v. McKesson & Robbins, 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 NB.2d 181 (1958) (permanent wave
solution).
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Suit was brought against the manufacturer and the dealer by Mr. and
Mrs. Henningsen. The complaint was based upon negligence and upon
breach of express and implied warranties. At the trial, the negligence
and express warranty counts were dismissed by the court and the cause
was submitted to the jury for determination solely on the issue of breach
of implied warranty. Verdicts were returned against both defendants.
On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of New Jersey it was held
that Mrs. Henningsen was entitled to recover from the manufacturer
for breach of implied warranty despite the fact that neither she nor her
purchaser-husband stood in privity with the Chrysler Corporation."
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors2 is a landmark decision. Already
it has been proclaimed the most important decision in products-iability
law since MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company.22 The opinion is an un-
usually trenchant and thorough one: the delineation of the issues is sharp,
the reasoning incisive, the language unequivocal. It may be expected to
have a great influence upon the movement toward strict liability for the
manufacturer.
The lengthy quotation which follows indicates the New Jersey court's
broad endorsement of the risk-spreading policy which lies at the core of
strict liability:
With the advent of mass-marketing, the manufacturer became re-
mote from the purchaser, sales were accomplished through intermedi-
aries, and the demand for the product was created by advertising media.
In such an economy it became obvious that the consumer was the per-
son being cultivated. Manifestly, the connotation of "consumer" was
broader than that of "buyer." He signified such a person who, in the
reasonable contemplation of the parties to the sale, might be expected
to use the product. Thus, where the commodities sold are such that if
defectively manufactured they will be dangerous to life or limb, then
society's interests can only be protected by eliminating the requirement
of privity between the maker and his dealers and the reasonably ex-
pected ultimate consumer. In that way the burden of losses consequent
upon use of defective articles is borne by those who are in a position to
either control the danger or make an equitable distribution of the losses
when they do occur.23
A very recent case which closely parallels Henningsen on its facts and
in its result, but which fails to come directly to grips with the policy of
strict liability, is General Motors Corporation v. Dodson.4 In that case
the purchaser of a new Oldsmobile was seriously injured in an accident
20. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
21. Ibid.
22. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See 1 FRuMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIA-
BILnY § 16.04(2) (a), at 406 (1960).
23. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 379, 161 A.2d 69, 80-81 (1960).
24. 338 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. App. 1960), cert. denied by the Tennessee Supreme Court,
Sept. 9, 1960.
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caused by the automobile's defective brakes. Suit was brought against
the manufacturer for breach of express and implied warranties. After
a jury verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs, General Motors appealed
on the ground, inter alia, that the trial court had erred in submitting the
issue of implied warranty to the jury because no privity existed between
General Motors and the plaintiffs. In affirming, the court of appeals
said:
The jury could have found that General Motors was the actual per-
son or entity with whom the plaintiffs were dealing, and [that the
dealer] was a conduit or subterfuge by which General Motors tried to
exempt itself from liability to the consumers....25
Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
There are, in addition to Henningsen and Dodson, a number of other
significant decisions in which manufacturers of general products have
been subjected to strict liability. While none of these can compare with
Henningsen in circumspect treatment of the strict liability-through-im-
plied warranty issue, several of the decisions do merit special considera-
tion. In discussing these cases particular emphasis will be given to the
language used by the courts in arriving at their decisions.
A "non-food" case which has already provoked considerable judicial
comment is Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Company," de-
cided by the Michigan Supreme Court in 1958. The defective product
involved in Spence was that enemy of American architecture, the cinder
block. The blocks purchased by the plaintiff cracked, chipped and "bled"
unsightly red stains. Suit was brought against the remote manufacturer
for negligence and for breach of implied warranty. The court squarely
met the defense of lack of privity. After observing that
... awesome have been some of the semantic bogs negotiated by ours
and other appellate courts when in particularly harsh cases they have
attempted... to get around the barrier imposed by [privityi...W
the court concluded that it could find
... no reason in logic or sound law why recovery in these situations
25. Id. at 661. The opinion gives a less than satisfactory analysis of the important legal ques-
tions presented in the case. The short passage quoted in the text contains the only remarks
-which may be regarded as directed to the privity requirement. It is not clear whether the state-
ment that the dealer could be found to have been a mere conduit for the manufacturer was in-
tended to express a universal marketing truth, or rather, that such a deduction would be
permissible only because of the particular circumstances of the present case, or at most, because
of the particular relationship existing between automobile manufacturers and their dealers.
From the language used, it is likely that the court meant only to take the latter stand. Since,
however, one of the most compelling arguments for the abolition of privity rests on the fact
that nearly all dealers are simply "conduits" for manufacturers, the court's indentification with
that argument in the present automobile manufacturer-dealer situation would, in logic, force
it to reach similar conclusions in cases involving other general products.
26. 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
27. Id. at 127, 90 N.W.2d at 877.
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[implied warranty] should be confined to injuries to persons and not to
property, or allowed in food and related cases and denied in all others. 28
Accordingly, the plaintiff was permitted to hold the manufacturer strictly
liable for breach of implied warranty.
The Spence case has particular significance because of the innocuous
nature of the product involved and because of the court's insistence that
implied warranty actions for property damages be given the same con-
sideration as those brought for personal injuries.
Florida aligned itself with the strict liability movement by its decision
in Continental Copper & Steel Industries, Inc. v. Cornelius,9 a case in-
volving defective electric cable. Suit against the remote manufacturer
was predicated on breach of implied warranty. Judgment for the con-
sumer-plaintiff was upheld by the court of appeals on the basis of clear-
cut dictum of the Florida Supreme Court in two earlier defective products
cases.
80
The activity of the California courts in extending strict liability to
the manufacturer has been of a spectacular but uneven nature. A judg-
ment for the plaintiff in one of the celebrated Cutter Laboratories cases
was recently affirmed, the appellate court holding that a child who had
contracted polio as a result of an injection of the defendant's polio vaccine
was entitled to recover in an action for breach of implied warranty,
despite the absence of privity.31
Because of the experimental nature of the product involved, and the
complete lack of legal fault on the part of the defendant, the result is a
bold one. The court's opinion, however, shows considerable restraint.
Emphasis was given to the fact that the ruling was taken by analogy to
the food and beverage cases; as to products in general, the court conceded
28. Id. at 130, 90 N.W.2d at 878. The exact holding of the court is obscured by the negligence
issues involved, but, nonetheless, several federal courts have taken it at face value and have
used it as a basis for permitting actions by consumers against remote manufacturers. Bowles
v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960) (defective surgical pin); Conlon v. Re-
public Aviation Corp., 6 Av. Cas. 17,982 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (defective airplane).
The case is commented upon, with only partial enthusiasm, in 1958 Annual Survey of
Micbigan Law, 5 WAYNE L. RfEV. 100 (1959), and in 1 FRUMER & FRIDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY S 16.04(2), at 413, 414 (1960).
29. 104 So.2d 40 (Fla. App. 1958).
30. Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So.2d 299, 300 (Fla. 1956); Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co.,
63 So.2d 514, 515 (Fla. 1953).
31. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Ct. App. 1960). The case
presents a number of extremely difficult questions, not the least of which is whether
or not the imposition of strict liability without fault upon organizations producing highly ex-
perimental medical products will have the effect of seriously hindering the development of
medical science. To this contention, raised by the defendant in Gottsdanker, Keatley, in his
article, Products on Trial, op. cit. supra note 1, quotes an attorney for the plaintiff as retorting:
"They talk as though they're entitled to one free catastrophe."
The questions presented in the Cutter Laboratories cases are discussed in Note, 65 YALE
LJ. 262 (1955).
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that privity of contract remained a prerequisite for the bringing of an
implied warranty action in California.82
Another recent case, decided by the California Supreme Court, per-
mitted a workman to recover against the manufacturer who had sold a
defective grinding wheel to the man's employer." The decision turned
upon the rather illusory theory that the workman was a member of the
industrial "family" of the employer and as such was clothed with suffi-
cient "privity" to maintain an action for breach of implied warranty
against the manufacturer. What effect this ruling will have upon the
course of strict liability in California is difficult to foretell.
If the California courts have been diffident in their approach to strict
liability for the manufacturer, the case of Beck v. Spindler" shows the
Minnesota Supreme Court's apparent willingness to adopt the strict liabil-
ity doctrine in toto. The case involved a house trailer whose defective
insulation caused inordinate condensation upon the trailer's inner walls
and ceiling. Although the purchase of the trailer had been from an
intermediary, suit for breach of implied warranty was brought against the
manufacturer. In discussing the defense of lack of privity, the court had
this to say:
It may well be that the time has come when we should discard the
whole troublesome idea that privity of contract is essential to recovery
on an implied warranty and extend liability to the one who has caused
the harm. If that were done, clearly the manufacturer of a chattel
would become liable because in many, if not most, of the cases it is the
manufacturer rather than the dealer who ought to know whether the
chattel is fit for the use for which it was sold. . . . it is difficult to see
why an injured party should be permitted to recover against the manu-
facturer on the theory that he negligently used improper material in the
construction of the trailer and not to be permitted to recover on the
theory that the manufacturer had breached an implied warranty that the
trailer was fit for use in the locality in which it was sold.85
The court, notwithstanding this progressive analysis of the manu-
facturer's responsibility to the ultimate consumer, chose to decide the
case upon a different theory,8" thereby reducing the foregoing language
to dictum. Nevertheless, it appears quite evident that the court would
32. The court referred to Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041
(1954), in which the Supreme Court held that privity was essential in all implied warranty
actions except those involving foods and beverages. In that case, however, the court did dis-
card the privity rule in actions based upon express warranty-through-labeling.
33. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 863 (Sup. Ct. 1960). The case is discussed
at length in 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUcTS LurmuTy § 16.03(7) (1960).
34. 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959).
35. Id. at 561, 99 N.W.2d at 682.
36. Because of an express warranty given by the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the court
reasoned, rather singularly, that the manufacturer was a "seller" within the meaning of the
Minnesota Sales Act. Id. at 562, 92 N.W.2d at 683.
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sympathetically receive arguments for strict liability if a proper implied
warranty case were brought before it.
The decisions which have just been discussed are representative of
state court activity in expanding the strict accountability of the manu-
facturer to his consumer." Federal courts, too, have shown a disposition
to break down the privity barrier in defective products cases.3" To date
the Southern District Court of New York has denied motions to dismiss
in four implied warranty actions brought against airplane manufacturers
for personal injuries or wrongful deaths. Three of these cases were de-
cided upon state law;" the fourth, Middleton v. United Aircraft Corpora-
tion," was brought pursuant to a federal statute, the Death on the High
Seas Act.4 The wrongful death action followed the crash of a helicopter
which had been manufactured by the defendant. The defendant filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that privity of contract had not been
present between it and the deceased pilot of the helicopter. The court
surveyed the history of the privity rule and concluded that it was an
anachronism which no longer deserved judicial sanction. The following
excerpts from the court's opinion show an unqualified acceptance of the
"philosophy" of strict liability which is reminiscent of that given by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Henningsen:
With liability of the manufacturer to one not in privity with him
on a negligence theory established, it is but one logical step forward to
allow recovery against a manufacturer on a breach of warranty theory
by one not in privity with him.
The progressive decline of the older rule [privity], based as it was on
an infirm and fallacious foundation is clearly evident. The fact that a
manufacturer of an aircraft located in Connecticut may become in-
volved in a disaster happening in the Gulf of Mexico may have unfor-
37. Other noteworthy implied warranty cases involving products other than food are:
Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959). Defective king-pin
in tractor-trailer's steering assembly resulted in extensive property damage. Recovery upon
implied warranty, without a showing of privity, upheld by the appellate court which relied
upon several Pennsylvania cases involving express warranties.
Brown v. Globe Laboratories, 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957). The purchaser of
livestock vaccine was permitted to recover against the remote manufacturer in an implied war-
ranty action. The opinion, though very lengthy, is strangely silent on the privity issue and
therefore appears somewhat suspect.
38. See, e.g., B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959). The court,
in apparent dedication to the strict liability movement, went somewhat beyond the Kansas
law in allowing a non-purchasing "consumer" to hold the remote manufacturer for breach of
implied warranty covering a sale of automobile tires. The court relied on Graham v. Borten-
field's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954), a case involving hair dye in which the ruling
was taken by analogy to the food cases.
39. Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 6 Av. Cas. 17,982 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (California
law); Siegel v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 6 Av. Cas. 17,978 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (Texas law); Con-
Ion v. Republic Aviation Corp., 6 Av. Cas. 17,982 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (Michigan law).
40. 6 Av. Cas. 17,975 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
41. 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1958).
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runate aspects, but that is not determinative of the question at issue.
... The fact that modern life and developments, such as transportation,
have taken on complex relationships is no anomaly. Complex relation-
ships result in complex responsibilities. If life is complex, so are the
laws of human relationship, which are the results thereof.
In the past year there has been nearly one decision a month in which
strict liability has been carried, through implied warranty, to the manu-
facturer of general products. In several of these cases there has been
more than a grudging recognition of the illogic of the privity rule; in sev-
eral there has been a broad and affirmative acceptance of the socio-eco-
nomic philosophy which supports the doctrine of strict liability. This
shift of judicial attitude in the implied warranty cases, coupled with the
expanding vitality of the express warranty-through-advertising doctrine,
suggests that a trend towards strict accountability for the manufacturer
has begun. In view of this movement, these are perhaps propitious times
for examining the adequacy of the legal vehicles through which strict
liability has been imposed.
THE INADEQUACIES OF THE WARRANTY SCHEME
Express Warranty
To prevail in an express warranty action against the manufacturer,
the consumer must be able to prove that the manufacturer has made a
positive assertion of fact upon which the plaintiff has relied to his in-
jury.43
What may be considered a positive assertion of fact?4" In one case
a label on a loaf of bread read:
This bread is 100 per cent pure, made under the most modern, scien-
tific process; has very special merit as a healthful and nutritious
food ...4r
It was held that this statement did not cover a nail found in the loaf
purchased by the plaintiff. On the other hand, in Worley v. Procter &
Gamble Manufacturing Company,40 the statement that "of course, Tide is
kind to hands" was said to be a sufficiently positive statement to permit
suit by a woman whose hands had become inflamed after use of the
detergent. These two cases, and the pettifogging distinctions found in
other express warranty cases, amply illustrate the fact that recovery in
42. Middleton v. United Aircraft Corp., 6 Av. Cas. 17,975, 17,977, 17,978 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
43. See PROSSER, TORTS § 88, at 546-49, § 89 (2d ed. 1955); James, Products Liability, 34
TmxAs L. REv. 44, 192 (1955).
44. The problem of distinguishing "warranty" from mere "sales-puffing'" is a difficult one.
See 1 FRtmER & FRiEDMAN, PRODUCrS IAnITrrY § 16.04(4) (c) (1960).
45. Newhall v. Ward Baking Co., 240 Mass. 434, 437, 134 N.E. 625, 626 (1922).
46. 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952).
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express warranty rests upon the unknowable influences of the English
language.
Equally elusive is the element of reliance. In many defective product
cases there has been no reliance in a conventional sense. Many purchases
are made perfunctorily, and though the buyer may realize that he has
a preference for a particular "brand," that preference does not always
turn upon any express statement made by the manufacturer. Even in
those situations in which the preference has been exercised because of a
particular claim made in the advertisement of the product or upon its
label, it does not often follow that that statement is the false one.
It is almost always difficult and sometimes impossible for the plain-
tiff to meet successfully the requisites for recovery in express warranty4
A recognition of this hardship may be seen in the tendency of the courts
to liberalize the technical burdens which weigh upon the plaintiff-con-
sumer.4" But even with this tendency toward liberalization express war-
ranty remains an essentially circumscribed method of imposing a policy
of strict liability, for there are many situations in which there is simply
no express statement upon which suit can be grounded.
Implied Warranty
As a warranty which is imposed by the law as a matter of policy,"'
and which is independent of the contract terms (except disclaimers"),
implied warranty would appear to be an ideal, and what is more, an
available means of implementing a broad judicial policy of strict liability
for the manufacturer. Unfortunately, such is not the case; the theoretical
capabilities of implied warranty have not been matched by the tangible
results which it has produced. There are a number of reasons for this.
One inadequacy of implied warranty has its roots in the very nature
of the warranty action. The following statement may be considered:
It has been said of warranty, 'A more notable example of legal mis-
cegenation could hardly be cited.' It originated in tort as a species of
relief for misrepresentation. Later there was added to this concept of
warranty another which was consensual in nature. In time, special as-
sumpsit rather than trespass on the case for deceit became the normal
remedy for breach of warranty and men came to think of warranty as
contract. But the old remained along with the new. Consequently war-
ranty is neither tort nor contract, it is both.51
47. In one case, for example, the plaintiff was denied recovery because he had not given any
attention at the time of purchase to an express warranty on the label of a bottle of liniment.
Randall v. Goodrich-Gamble Co., 238 Minn. 10, 54 N.W.2d 769 (1952).
48. See Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.X.2d 612 (1958).
49. Bekkevold v. Ports, 173 Minn. 87, 89, 216 N.W. 790, 791 (1927).
50. IA UNFoRM LAws ANN. § 71; James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REV. 192,
210-12 (1955).
51. Spruill, Privity of Contract as a Requisite for Recovery on Warranty, 19 N.C.L. REv.
551, 552-53 (1941).
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Progressive courts have resurrected or perpetuated the tort elements of
warranty in actions brought by the consumer against the remote manu-
facturer. Other courts, however, have continued to be harnessed by the
contractual side of warranty's derivation, and thus have applied contract
rather than tort rules in determining such matters as the applicable meas-
ure of damages and the standing to sue of the injured party.52
A second and very real shortcoming of implied warranty lies in the
fact that all warranties are in thirty-five states governed by the Uniform
Sales Act.'u There are a number of provisions in this act which seriously
restrict the usefulness of implied warranty as a means of effecting a policy
of liability without fault.
The Sales Act was promulgated at a time when warranties running to
persons other than purchasers were unthought of. The definitions of
"buyer" and "seller" within the act were drawn with the immediate
parties to the sale in mind."4 Thus the act has often been interpreted as
excluding suits brought by members of the purchaser's family or other
unrelated third parties who have been injured by the defective product."5
Another provision of the Sales Act which does not lend itself to the
scheme of strict liability is that which requires the buyer to give notice to
the seller withii a reasonable time after the breach.5" Although this rule
has sound commercial application, it can lead to hardship in personal
injury actions brought by the consumer. The injured consumer is seldom
"steeped in the business practice which justifies the rule," and, as Prosser
has said, until the consumer "has had legal advice it will not occur to
him to give notice to one with whom he has had no dealings."58
Another commercial rule sanctioned by the Sales Act is that of dis-
claimer. The "seller" is empowered to disclaim any express or implied
warranty which might otherwise have attached to the sale.59 When
reasonably pursued, and in a commercial context, disclaimer may be a
52. See Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099, 1126-27 (1960); Amram & Goodman, Some Problems in the Law of Implied Warranty,
3 SYRACUSE L. RBv. 259 (1952).
53. 1 UNIFORM LAws ANN. §§ 12-16. Section 15 of the Sales Act provides that no implied
warranties except those described by the act arise when a sale is made. Taken in conjunction
with other provisions of the act, this section could seriously limit the use of implied warranty
actions against remote manufacturers. See Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1128-29 (1960), and cases cited therein.
54. 1A UNIFORM LAws ANN. § 76.
55. See PROSSER, TORTS § 84, at 506-07 (2d ed. 1955), and cases cited therein. See also,
Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099,
1117-18 (1960).
56. 1A UNIFORM LAws ANN. 9 49.
57. James, Products Liability, 34 TExAS L. REv. 192, 197 (1955).
58. Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099,
1130 (1960).
59. 1A UNIFORM LAWs ANN. § 71. James, Products Liability, 34 TExAs L. REv. 192,
210-12 (1955); Wilson, Products Liability, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 809, 835-40 (1955).
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justifiable means of protection for the seller. But with regard to the
manufacturer's relationship to the ultimate consumer, the power of dis-
claimer may be a dangerous and unreasonable one. If public policy de-
mands the absolute liability of the manufacturer to the ultimate con-
sumer, then he should not be permitted to skirt this responsibility by
simply attaching a disclaimer of liability to his product.
It is not necessary to continue with this list of implied warranty's
shortcomings. They have been presented in full spectrum in the "food"
cases and have already undergone close scrutiny.60 More rewarding
would be a search for some other means of implementing the "public
policy" of strict liability for the manufacturer.6 Happily, this search need
not be a protracted one. Prosser has already suggested a solution which
has immediate appeal.
THE NEw TORT
After observing that even those courts which have said that "'the
remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon the
intricacies of the law of sales,' have proceeded to entangle themselves in
precisely those intricacies like Laocoon and his sons,"6 Prosser states that
the whole warranty snarl is completely unnecessary. No one doubts, he
says, that
... unless there is privity, liability to the consumer must be in tort and
not in contract. There is no need to borrow a concept from the contract
law of sales; and it is "only by some violent pounding and twisting" that
"warranty" can be made to serve the purpose at all. Why talk of it?
If there is to be strict liability in tort, let there be strict liability in tort,
declared outright, without an illusory contract mask.63
This position, with respect to the manufacturer,64 appears to be in-
60. See DIcKERsoN, PRoDucrs LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER (1951); James,
Products Liability, 34 TEXAs L. REv. 44, 192 (1955); Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
61. In 1957 Georgia enacted the following statute:
The manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property, either directly
or through wholesale or retail dealers, or any other person, shall warrant the follow-
ing to the ultimate consumer, who, however, must exercise caution when purchasing
to detect defects, and, provided there is no express covenant of warranty and no agree-
ment to the contrary:
1. The article sold is merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended.
2. The manufacturer knows of no latent defect undisclosed.
GA. CODE ANN. § 96-307 (1958). The statute was held constitutional in Bookholt v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 215 Ga. 391, 110 S.E.2d 642 (1959).
62. Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099,
1134 (1960).
63. Ibid.
64. Prosser intimates, though he does not specifically state, that the "new tort" should apply
with equal force to all commercial sellers, and not to the manufacturer alone. While there is
considerable practical justification for this view, it does not, as a matter of policy, appear that
other sellers owe the same degree of responsibility to the public as the manufacturer. Retailers
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disputably sound. Strict liability is not a new and hideous visage in the
law of torts. If, as the cases previously discussed indicate, the courts are
showing a disposition to impose strict liability upon the manufacturer,
there is no reason for their philosophy to be obscured by a bridge of legal
fictions on the one hand, or by a sales law vocabulary on the other.
Liability under the proposed "new tort" would, in its bare thesis,
closely approximate that imposed by implied warranty. The manu-
facturer would be liable to the ultimate consumer if the product was not
reasonably suited to the general purposes for which it was manufactured
and sold."5 The plaintiff would retain his burden of proving that the
defect existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's hands, and
that his injuries proximately resulted from that defect.66 The manu-
facturer's liability with regard to the status of the injured party (i.e.,
whether purchaser, member of purchaser's family, unrelated third party)
would be determined by a pragmatic test of foreseeabiity rather than by
the technical rules of the law of sales.67 Many important issues, such
as those raised by the "age" and condition of the product, and the use
to which it has been put by the plaintiff, would be resolved by the ap-
plication of principles carried over from the negligence cases." Dis-
claimers of liability, except perhaps in certain rare situations, 9 would not
be tolerated. Strict liability would attach without regard to the express
representations of the manufacturer.
Although the response to this "new tort" has been sympathetic, there
and wholesalers are increasingly becoming mere "conduits" (albeit very powerful ones in cer-
tain instances) by which manufacturers transmit their goods to the consuming public. The
testing and inspection resources of these intermediaries are almost non-existent and, indeed,
they are rarely expected to test or inspect for defects.
With respect to the retailer this may appear to be an idle argument since he has tradition-
ally been subjected to strict liability through the implied warranty of the law of sales. The
distinction, however, lies in the fact that the seller is provided with certain safeguards under
the warranty scheme (disclaimer, notice, reliance, etc.) which would not be available under
the "new tort."
Taking a broad view of the "public policies" in which the doctrine of strict liability is
suspended, there seems to be justification for seeing in the new tort a second benefit, this being
the relief which it would bring to retailers who are often beset by damage claims which do not
in justice belong at their feet.
65. A new criterion of liability called "typicality of risk" has been introduced into the pro-
ducts liability field. It is discussed in Wilson, Products Liability, 43 CAL'F. L. REv. 809
(1955).
66. See James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REV. 192 (1955).
67. The Henningsen case reached this point under the implied warranty theory: "Manifestly,
the connotation of 'consumer' was broader than that of 'buyer.' He signified such a person
who, in the reasonable contemplation of the parties to the sale, might be expected to use the
product." Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 379, 161 A.2d 69, 81 (1960).
68. See Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YAIX L.J.
1099, 1138-48 (1960).
69. It may be beneficial to allow freedom of contract to override the policy of strict liability
in situations where the manufacturer has no possible way of effectively testing the product or
of ascertaining its worth. Experimental drugs might be included in this category.
